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Abstract. To resolve conflicts among norms, various nonmonotonic formalisms
can be used to perform prioritized normative reasoning. Meanwhile, formal ar-
gumentation provides a way to represent nonmonotonic logics. In this paper, we
propose a representation of prioritized normative reasoning by argumentation.
Using hierarchical abstract normative systems, we define three kinds of priori-
tized normative reasoning approaches, called Greedy, Reduction, and Optimiza-
tion. Then, after formulating an argumentation theory for a hierarchical abstract
normative system, we show that for a totally ordered hierarchical abstract nor-
mative system, Greedy and Reduction can be represented in argumentation by
applying the weakest link and the last link principles respectively, and Optimiza-
tion can be represented by introducing additional defeats capturing the idea that
for each argument that contains a norm not belonging to the maximal obeyable
set then this argument should be rejected.
1 Introduction
Since the work of Alchourro´n and Makinson [1] on hierarchies of regulations and their
logic, in which a partial ordering on a code of laws or regulations is used to overcome
logical imperfections in the code itself, reasoning with prioritized norms has been a
central challenge in deontic logic [12,4,23].
The goal of this paper is to study the open issue of reasoning with priorities over
norms through the lens of argumentation theory [10]. More precisely, we focus on rea-
soning with the abstract normative system proposed by Tosatto et al. [28], which in turn
is based on Makinson and van der Torre’s approach to input/output logic [20]. In this
system, an abstract norm is represented by an ordered pair (a, x), where the body of the
norm a is thought of as an input, representing some kind of condition or situation, and
the head of the norm x is thought of as an output, representing what the norm tells us
to be obligatory in that situation a. As a consequence, an abstract normative system is
a directed graph (L,N) together with a context C ⊆ L capturing base facts, where L
is a set of nodes, and N ⊆ L × L is the set of abstract norms. When the edge of an
abstract normative system is associated with a number to indicate its priority over the
other norms in the system, we obtain a hierarchical abstract normative system (HANS),
which will be formally defined and studied in the remainder of this paper.
Let us clarify how a hierarchical abstract normative system is defined by considering
the well known Order Puzzle [17] example from the deontic logic literature, which
revolves around three norms.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
9.
08
03
4v
2 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 28
 Fe
b 2
01
8
2 B. Liao N. Oren, L. van der Torre and S. Villata
“Suppose that there is an agent, called Corporal O’Reilly, and that he is subject
to the commands of three superior officers: a Captain, a Major, and a Colonel.
The Captain, who does not like to be cold, issues a standing order that, during
the winter, the heat should be turned on. The Major, who is concerned about
energy conservation, issues an order that, during the winter, the window should
not be opened. And the Colonel, who does not like to be too warm and does
not care about energy conservation, issues an order that, whenever the heat is
on, the window should be opened.”
Hierarchical Abstract
Normative System
Extensions 
Greedy :{h,¬o}
Reduction :{h, o}
Optimization :{¬o}
h
ow
1
2
>
3
1 : (w, h)
2 : (w,¬o)
3 : (h, o)
Fig. 1. The Order puzzle example, represented using the graphical notation of Tosatto et al. [29]
with edges annotated by norm strength.
Let w, h and o respectively denote the propositions that it is winter, the heat is
turned on, and the window is open. There are three norms (w, h), (w,¬o) and (h, o).
These three norms are visualized in Figure 1, extending the graphical notation de-
scribed in Tosatto et al. [29] by associating edges with numbers denoting priorities of
norms. These priorities are obtained from the rank of the issuer, since Colonels outrank
Majors, and Majors outrank Captains. Within the figure, each circle denotes a propo-
sition; the light part of the circle is the proposition itself, while the dark part denotes
a negated proposition. Dashed lines represent the conditional obligations. Within Fig-
ure 1, the line from the light part of w to the dark part of o denotes (w,¬o). The box on
the left represents the context, in the example containing > and w.
In formalizing examples, one problem in applied logic is that the representation
may be challenged. For example, it may be argued that the Colonel implies that if the
window is closed, then the heating should be turned off. However, in normative systems,
such pragmatic considerations are usually not part of the detachment procedure [16],
with only explicitly given norms and commands being considered. Therefore, any such
additional interpretations or other pragmatic concerns are out of the scope of this paper.
The central notion of inference in normative systems is called detachment. For ex-
ample, in the Order Puzzle, the fundamental question is whether we can detach o, ¬o, or
both. In the example, the formulas which can be derived from a normative system are
obligations. In general, permissions and institutional facts can also be detached from
normative systems. A detachment procedure therefore defines the way deontic facts are
derived from a normative system. Different detachment procedures have been defined
and studied in deontic logic, as well as in other rule based systems. Moreover, even in
hierarchical normative systems, not all conflicts may be resolved. In such a case, the
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detachment procedure may derive several so-called extensions, each representing a set
of obligations, permissions and institutional facts.
Abstract normative systems [28] were introduced as a common core representation
for normative systems, which are still expressive enough to define the main detachment
procedures. In particular, analogous to the main input/output logics, they have factual
detachment built in, and have reasoning by cases, deontic detachment and identity as
optional inference patterns [3,16]. Such systems are called ‘abstract’, because negation
is the only logical connective that is defined in the language. Furthermore, Tosatto et
al. [28] considered elements and anti-elements rather than literals and propositions. It is
straightforward to define more connectives within such systems, and it is also possible
to define structured normative systems where the abstract elements are instantiated with
logical formulas, for example with formulas of a propositional or modal logic. The latter
more interesting representation of logical structure is analogous to the use of abstract
arguments in formal argumentation. An advantage of abstract normative systems over
structured ones is that the central inference of detachment can be visualized by walking
paths in the graph. In other words, inference is represented by graph reachability. For
example, in the Order puzzle, node o is reachable from the context, and thus it can be
detached. Moreover, a conflict is represented by a node where both its light and the dark
side are reachable from the context, as in the case of node o in Figure 1.
There are several optional inference patterns for abstract normative systems, be-
cause, as is well known, most principles of deontic logic have been criticized for some
examples and applications. However, the absence of the same inference patterns is often
criticized as well due to the lack of explanations and predictions of the detachment pro-
cedures resulting from these patterns. Therefore, current approaches to represent and
reason with normative systems, such as input/output logic as well as abstract norma-
tive systems, do not restrict themselves to a single logic, but define a family of logics
which can be embedded within them. Deciding which logic to use in a specific context
depends on the requirements of the application. Similarly, with regards to permissions,
there is an even larger diversity of deontic logics [15] which adopt different represen-
tations. For example, for each input/output logic, various notions of permission have
been defined, in terms of their relation to obligation. We refer to the work of Parent and
van der Torre [23] for further explanation, discussion and motivation of this topic.
Now let us consider how various detachment procedures might apply norms in hi-
erarchical normative systems in different orders, and result in different outcomes or
extensions. Since detachment operates differently over permissions and obligations,
and since the former introduces significant extra complexity, we only consider regu-
lative norms and obligation detachment procedures in this paper. We examine three
approaches describing well known procedures defined in the literature [32,5,14]. These
procedures all share one important property, namely that the context itself is not nec-
essarily part of the procedure’s output. It is precisely this feature which distinguishes
input/output logics from traditional rule based languages like logic programming or
default logic [26,6]. Such traditional rule based languages where the input is part of
the output are called throughput operators in input/output logic research. Therefore, the
procedures we consider can naturally be captured using input/output logics. We refer to
the three approaches as Greedy, Reduction and Optimization.
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Greedy: The context contains propositions that are known to hold. This procedure
always applies the norm with the highest priority that does not introduce inconsistency
to an extension and the context. Here we say that a norm is applicable when its body is
in the context or has been produced by other norms and added to the extension. In the
Order puzzle example, we begin with the context {w}, and (w,¬o) is first applied. Then
(w, h) is applied. Finally, (h, o) cannot be applied as this would result in a conflict, and
so, by using Greedy, we obtain the extension {h,¬o}.
Reduction: in this approach, a candidate extension is guessed. All norms that are
applicable according to this candidate extension are selected and transformed into un-
conditional or body-free norms. For example, a norm (a, b) selected in this way is trans-
formed to a norm (>, b). The modified hierarchical abstract normative system, with the
transformed norms is then evaluated using Greedy. The candidate extension is selected
as an extension by Reduction if it is identified as an extension according to this applica-
tion of Greedy. In our example, we select a candidate extension {h, o}, obtaining a set
of body-free norms {(>, h), (>,¬o), (>, o)}. The priorities assigned to these norms
are carried through from the original hierarchical abstract normative system, and are
therefore respectively 1, 2 and 3. After applying Greedy, we get an extension of Re-
duction: {h, o}. However, if we had selected the candidate extension {h,¬o}, then this
new extension would not appear in Greedy as (>,¬o) has a lower priority than (>, o),
and the latter is therefore not an extension of Reduction.
Optimization: In terms of Hansen’s prioritized conditional imperatives, a set of max-
imally obeyable (i.e., minimally violated) norms is selected by choosing norms in order
of priority which are consistent with the context. Once these norms are selected, Greedy
is applied to identify the extension. In our example, the maximal set of obeyable norms
is {(h, o), (w,¬o)}. Optimization therefore detaches the unique extension {¬o}.
We can also consider the example in terms of formal argumentation. Given a hi-
erarchical abstract normative system, we may construct an argumentation framework.
The top part of Figure 2 illustrates the argumentation framework obtained for the Order
puzzle which does not consider the priority relation between arguments.
An argumentation framework is a directed graph in which nodes denote arguments,
and edges denote attacks between arguments. In the setting of a hierarchical abstract
normative system, an argument is represented as a path within the directed graph start-
ing from a node in the context. In this example, there are four arguments A0, A1, A2
and A3, represented as [w], [(w, h)], [(w, h), (h, o)] and [(w,¬o)], respectively. Since
the conclusions of A2 and A3 are inconsistent, A2 attacks A3 and vice-versa. To obtain
correct conclusions, we must take priorities between arguments into account, trans-
forming attacks into defeats. This in turn requires lifting the priorities given for the con-
stituents of an argument to a priority for the argument itself, and two different principles
have been commonly used for such a lifting. The last link principle ranks an argument
based on the strength of its last inference, while the weakest link principle ranks an
argument based on the strength of its weakest inference. In the order example, if the
last link principle is applied, then [(w, h), (h, o)] defeats [(w,¬o)]. The corresponding
argumentation framework is illustrated in the middle portion of Figure 2. If the weakest
link principle is used instead, then [(w,¬o)] defeats [(w, h), (h, o)]. The corresponding
argumentation framework is illustrated at the bottom of Figure 2. As a result, the former
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principle allows us to conclude {h, o}, while the latter concludes {h,¬o}. In turn, the
first result coincides with that obtained by Reduction, while the second is the same as
that obtained by Greedy.
A0 A1 A2 A3
[w] [(w, h)] [(w, h), (h, o)] [(w,¬o)]
A0 A1 A2 A3
[w] [(w, h)] [(w, h), (h, o)] [(w,¬o)]
A0 A1 A2 A3
[w] [(w, h)] [(w, h), (h, o)] [(w,¬o)]
Fig. 2. Top: the argumentation framework obtained from the order puzzle hierarchical normative
system with the four arguments and attacks between them visualized as directed arrows. Mid-
dle: the argumentation framework obtained when last link is applied. Bottom: the argumentation
framework obtained when weakest link is applied.
Inspired by the example above, we wish to investigate the links between the three
detachment procedures for prioritized normative reasoning and argumentation theory.
More specifically, our main research question is as follows.
How can the three detachment procedures (Reduction, Greedy, and Optimiza-
tion) proposed in the context of abstract normative reasoning be represented in
formal argumentation?
To answer this research question, we propose a formal framework to connect hierar-
chical normative reasoning with argumentation theory. More precisely, our framework
represents the above-mentioned detachment procedures by lifting priorities from norms
to arguments, with the underlying goal of making as few commitments as possible to
specific argumentation systems. For this reason, we build on a structured argumenta-
tion framework which admits undercuts and rebuts between arguments, and allows for
priorities between norms making up arguments. We show that variants of approaches to
lifting priorities from rules to arguments allow us to capture both Greedy and Reduc-
tion, while the introduction of additional defeats allows us to obtain Optimization.
Some preliminary results found in this paper were originally presented in DEON
2016 [19]. We keep, but extend, the representation results for Greedy and Reduc-
tion (previously called the “Brewka-Eiter construction”). To capture Optimization (pre-
viously called “Hansen’s construction”) the DEON 2016 paper adds new arguments
through the introduction of additional permissive norms. In the current paper, this is
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replaced with an approach which introduces additional defeats. The reasons for this
replacement are two-fold. First, the preliminary approaches for Optimization from the
earlier work [19] cannot fully capture the idea that each argument containing a norm not
belonging to the maximal obeyable set should be rejected. Second, permissive norms
were used as a means to support the representation, which making the approach more
complicated.
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formalizes the
above-mentioned three detachment procedures of hierarchical normative reasoning (i.e.,
Greedy, Reduction, and Optimization). In Section 3, we introduce an argumentation the-
ory for a hierarchical abstract normative system. Sections 4, 5 and 6 show how Greedy,
Reduction and Optimization can be represented in argumentation. Finally, in Section 7
we discuss open problems and compare the proposed approach with related work, and
in Section 8 we point out possible directions for future work.
2 Hierarchical abstract normative systems
In this section, we formally introduce the notion of hierarchical abstract normative sys-
tems and the three detachment procedures to compute their normative conclusions. A
hierarchical abstract normative system captures the context of a system and the norms in
force in such a system. There is an element in the universe called >, contained in every
context. In this paper, we consider only a finite universe. A hierarchical abstract norma-
tive system also encodes a ranking function over the norms to allow for the resolution
of conflicts.
Based on the notion of abstract normative system defined by Tosatto et al. [28], a
hierarchical abstract normative system can be defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Hierarchical abstract normative system). A hierarchical abstract nor-
mative system is a tupleH = 〈L,N,C, r〉, where
– L = E ∪ {¬e | e ∈ E} ∪ {>} is the universe, a set of literals based on some finite
set E of atomic elements;
– N ⊆ L× L is a finite set of regulative norms;
– C ⊆ L is a subset of the universe, called a context, such that > ∈ C and for all e
in E, {e,¬e} 6⊆ C;
– r : N → IN is a function from norms to natural numbers.
Regulative (ordinary) norms are of the kind “if you turn on the heat, then you should
open the window”. These norms are conditional norms, requiring some condition to
hold (e.g., turning on the heat) before their conclusions can be drawn.
We write (a, x) for a regulative norm, where a, x ∈ L are the antecedent and con-
clusion of the norm, respectively. Given (a, x), we use r(a, x) to denote r((a, x)). Let
u, v ∈ N be two norms, we say that v is at least as preferred as u (denoted u ≤ v)
if and only if r(u) is not larger than r(v) (denoted r(u) ≤ r(v)), where r(u) is also
called the rank of u. We write u < v or v > u if and only if u ≤ v and v 6≤ u. Given
a norm u = (a, x), we write ant(u) for a to represent the antecedent of the norm, and
cons(u) for x to represent the consequent of the norm. Given a set of norms S ⊆ N ,
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we use cons(S) to denote {cons(u) | u ∈ S}. We say that a hierarchical abstract nor-
mative system is totally ordered if and only if the ordering ≤ over N is antisymmetric,
transitive and total. Due to the finiteness of universe, the set of norms is finite. Note that
given this assumption, the notion of total ordering here is identical to that of the full
prioritization in Brewka and Eiter’s [7] and Hansen’s [13] work, and of the linearized
ordering of Young et al. [32]. For a ∈ L, we write a = ¬a if and only if a ∈ E, and
a = e for e ∈ E if and only if a = ¬e. For a set S ⊆ L, we say that S is consistent if
and only if there exist no e1, e2 ∈ S such that e1 = e2. To exemplify the notions of a
hierarchical abstract normative system, consider the following example.
Example 1 (Order puzzle). In terms of Definition 1, the set of norms and priorities
that are visualized in Figure 1 can be formally represented as a hierarchical abstract
normative system H = 〈L,N , C, r〉, where L = {w, h, o,¬w,¬h,¬o,>}, N =
{(w, h), (h, o), (w,¬o)}, C = {w,>}, r(w, h) = 1, r(h, o) = 3, r(w,¬o) = 2.
In the hierarchical abstract normative system setting, the three detachment proce-
dures for prioritized normative reasoning can be defined as follows.
Firstly, Greedy detachment for a hierarchical abstract normative system always ap-
plies the norm with the highest priority among those which can be applied, if this does
not bring inconsistency to the extension and the context. To formally define the notion
of Greedy, we first introduce the following notions of paths and consistent paths.
Definition 2 (Path, consistent path). LetH = 〈L, N,C, r〉 be a hierarchical abstract
normative system.
– A path inH from x1 to xn is a sequence of norms (x1, x2), (x2, x3), . . . , (xn−1, xn)
such that {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), . . . , (xn−1, xn)} ⊆ N , n ≥ 2, and all norms of the
sequence are distinct.
– A path inH from x1 to xn with respect to R ⊆ N is a sequence of norms (x1, x2),
(x2, x3), . . . , (xn−1, xn) such that {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), . . . , (xn−1, xn)} ⊆ R, n ≥
2, and all norms of the sequence are distinct.
– A consistent path in H from x1 to xn (with respect to R) is a path (x1, x2),
(x2, x3), . . . , (xn−1, xn) such that {x1, x2, . . . , xn} is consistent.
Then, the unique extension of a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative sys-
tem by Greedy can be defined as follows by first selecting a set of applicable norms
with the highest priority in each step, and then collecting the final vertex of each path
with respect to the set of selected norms.
Definition 3 (Greedy). LetH = 〈L,N,C, r〉 be a totally ordered hierarchical abstract
normative system. For allR ⊆ N , letR(C) = {x | there is a path inH from an element
inC to x with respect toR}, and Appl(N,C,R) := {(a, x) ∈ N \R | a ∈ C∪cons(R),
{x, x}6⊆ C ∪ cons(R)}. The extension ofH by Greedy, written as Greedy(H), is the set
R(C) such that R = ∪∞i=0Ri is built inductively as follows.
R0 = ∅
Ri+1 = Ri ∪max(N,C,Ri, r)
where max(N,C,Ri, r) = {u ∈ Appl(N,C,Ri) | ∀v ∈ Appl(N,C,Ri) : r(u) ≥
r(v)}.
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In terms of Definition 3, the unique extension of the Order puzzle can be constructed
as follows.
Example 2 (Extension by Greedy). Given H in Example 1, by Greedy, it holds that
R0 = ∅, R1 = {(w,¬o)}, R2 = {(w,¬o), (w, h)}, R = {(w,¬o), (w, h)}. So,
Greedy(H) = {h,¬o}.
Reduction is defined by first using a candidate extension to get a modified hier-
archical abstract normative system, and then applying Greedy to it. If the candidate
extension is an extension according to this application of Greedy, then it is an extension
of the original hierarchical abstract normative system by Reduction. Formally, we have
the following definition.
Definition 4 (Reduction). Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative sys-
tem H = 〈L,N , C, r〉, and a set X , let HX=〈L,N ′, C, r′〉, where N ′ = {(>, x2) |
(x1, x2) ∈ N, x1 ∈ C∪X} is the set of ordinary norms, and r′(>, x2) = max(r(x1, x2) |
(x1, x2) ∈ N, x1 ∈ C ∪X) for all (x1, x2) ∈ N are priorities over norms. An exten-
sion of H by Reduction is a set U such that U is Greedy(HU ). The set of extensions of
H by Reduction is denoted as Reduction(H).
According to Definition 4, it can be the case that different norms have the same
consequent. To avoid the duplication of multiple body-free norms, only a single norm
with the highest priority is used.
To exemplify the notion of Reduction, consider again the Order puzzle in Exam-
ple 1.
Example 3 (Extensions by Reduction). By using Reduction, givenX = {h, o}, we have
HX = 〈L,N ′, C, r′〉, where N ′ = {(>, h), (>, o), (>,¬o)}, r′(>, h) = 1, r′(>, o) =
3 and r′(>,¬o) = 2. Since X ∈ Greedy(HX), and no other set can be an extension,
we have that Reduction(H) = {{h, o}}.
Note that a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system might have more
than one extension, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 4 (Multiple extensions by Reduction). Given the hierarchical abstract norma-
tive system in Figure 3, assume that we have a context C = {a}. We then consider
X1 = {b, c} and X2 = {¬b}. In the first case, we have HX1 = 〈L,N ′, C, r′〉 where
N ′ = {(>, b), (>,¬b), (>, c)} and r′(>, b) = 4, r′(>, c) = 3, r′(>,¬b) = 2. Here,
Greedy(HX1) = {b, c}, i.e., X1.
In the second case, we obtainHX2 = 〈L,N ′, C, r′〉 where N ′ = {(>, b), (>,¬b)}
and r′(>, b) = 1, r′(>,¬b) = 2. Now, Greedy(HX2) = {¬b}, i.e., X2. In this case,
we therefore obtain two extensions using Reduction.
Finally, Optimization can be defined by first choosing a set of maximally obeyable
norms, and then applying Greedy to it.
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a b c
> 1
1 : (a, b)
2 : (a,¬b)
3 : (b, c)
4 : (c, b)2 3
4
Fig. 3. The hierarchical abstract normative system of Example 3 containing the two Reduction
extensions {b, c} and {¬b}.
Definition 5 (Optimization). Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative
system H = 〈L,N , C, r〉, let T = (u1, u2, . . . , un) be the linear order on N such that
u1 > u2 > · · · > un. We define a sequence of sets of norms R0 . . . Rn as follows:
R0 = ∅
Ri+1 =
{
Ri ∪ {ui}, if C ∪R(C) is consistent where R = Ri ∪ {ui}
Ri, else
The unique extension ofH by Optimization is Rn(C) and denoted as Optimization(H).
According to Definition 5, the unique extension of the Order puzzle can be con-
structed as follows.
Example 5 (Extension by Optimization). Regarding H in Example 1, by Optimization,
let u1 = (h, o), u2 = (w, ¬o), and u3 = (w, h), and T = (u1, u2, u3). Then, it holds
that R0 = ∅, R1 = {u1}, R2 = {u1, u2}, and R = R3 = R2 = {u1, u2}. So, we
obtain that Optimization(H) = {¬o}.
3 Argumentation theory for a hierarchical abstract normative
system
In this section, we introduce an argumentation theory on prioritized norms. Given a
hierarchical abstract normative system, we first define arguments and defeats between
them, then compute extensions of arguments in terms of Dung’s theory [10], and from
these, obtain conclusions.
3.1 Arguments
In a hierarchical abstract normative system, an argument is an acyclic path in the graph
starting in an element of the context. We assume minimal arguments—no norm can be
applied twice in an argument and no redundant norm is included in an argument. We
use concl(α) to denote the conclusion of an argument α, and concl(E) = {concl(α) |
α ∈ E} for the conclusions of a set of arguments E.
Definition 6 (Arguments and sub-arguments). Let H = 〈L,N,C, r〉 be a hierarchi-
cal abstract normative system.
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A context argument inH is an element a ∈ C, and its conclusion is concl(a) = a.
An ordinary argument is a consistent path α in H from x ∈ C to some y ∈ L.
Moreover, we have that concl(α) = y.
The sub-arguments of argument [u1, . . . , un] are, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, [u1, . . . , ui]. Note
that context arguments do not have sub-arguments.
The set of all arguments constructed from H is denoted as Arg(H). For readability,
[(a1, a2), . . . , (an−1, an)] may be written as (a1, a2, . . . , an−1, an). The set of sub-
arguments of an argument α is denoted as sub(α). When α is a sub-argument of β,
we say that β is a super-argument of α. The set of super-arguments of α is denoted
as sup(α). Furthermore, the set of proper sub-arguments of α is defined as psub(α) =
sub(α) \ {α}. For an ordinary argument α = [u1, . . . , un], we call un the top norm
of α. Finally, in each ordinary argument, the norm with lowest priority is called the
weakest norm of the argument. Formally, we have the following definition for this latter
concept.
Definition 7 (The weakest norm of an argument). LetH be a totally ordered hierar-
chical abstract normative system. For an ordinary argument α = [u1, . . . , un] in H, if
r(ui) = min(r(uj) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n), then ui is called the weakest norm of α.
3.2 Defeat relation between arguments
We follow the tradition in much of preference-based argumentation [2,21], where at-
tack captures a relation among arguments which ignores preferences, and defeat is a
preference-aware relation on which the semantics is based. To define the defeat relation
among prioritized arguments, we assume that only the priorities of the norms are used
to compare arguments. In other words, we assume a lifting of the ordering on norms to
a binary relation on sequences of norms (i.e., arguments), written as α  β, where α
and β are two arguments, indicating that α is at least as preferred as β.
There is no common agreement about the best way to lift≥ to. In argumentation,
there are at least two ways to introduce weights. As an argumentation framework con-
sists of a set of arguments and an attack relation between them, we can either assign
weights to arguments, or we can assign weights to attacks. Traditionally, weights are as-
signed to arguments. Two common approaches to give the strength of an argument are
the weakest link and the last link principles, combined with the elitist and democratic
ordering [21]. For example, in the weakest link principle the weight of the argument is
the weight of the weakest rule used in the argument. However, Young et al. [32] showed
that elitist weakest link cannot be used to calculate  for Greedy, and proposes a dis-
joint elitist order which ignores shared rules. It is worth noticing that the strength of an
argument may depend on the argument it is attacking, as identified by Young et al. [32].
Based on this idea, we define the orderings between arguments by assigning a strength
to the attacks between the arguments, to reflect the priority of the norms used in the
arguments, following the same insights of the weakest link and last link principles (de-
noted as w and l respectively). Defining the weakest link ordering in the same way
as Young et al. [32], we have the following definition.
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Definition 8 (Weakest link and last link). Let H = 〈L,N , C, r〉 be a hierarchical
abstract normative system, and α = [u1, . . . , un] and β = [v1, . . . , vm] be two argu-
ments in Arg(H). Let Φ1 = {u1, . . . , un} and Φ2 = {v1, . . . , vm}. By the weakest link
principle, α w β iff ∃v ∈ Φ2 \ Φ1 such that ∀u ∈ Φ1 \ Φ2, v ≤ u. By the last link
principle, α l β iff un ≥ vm.
When the context is clear, we write  for w, or l. We write α  β for α  β
without β  α. The following proposition shows the transitivity of the two relations
w and l.
Proposition 1 (Transitivity). It holds that the relations w and l are transitive.
Proof. Let α = [u1, . . . , un], β = [v1, . . . , vm] and γ = [w1, . . . , wk] be three ar-
guments in Arg(H). For the case of the weakest link, let Φ1 = {u1, . . . , un}, Φ2 =
{v1, . . . , vm}, and Φ3 = {w1, . . . , wk}, n,m, k ≥ 1. Let x12 ∈ Φ1∩Φ2, x13 ∈ Φ1∩Φ3,
and x23 ∈ Φ2∪Φ3, x1 ∈ Φ1 \(Φ2∪Φ3), x2 ∈ Φ2 \(Φ1∪Φ3), and x3 ∈ Φ3 \(Φ1∪Φ2).
Assume that α w β and β w γ. There are only the following four possible cases.
Case 1: There exists x23 ∈ Φ2, for all x13, x1 ∈ Φ1, x23 ≤ x13 and x23 ≤ x1; and
since x13 ∈ Φ3, assume that for all x12, x2 ∈ Φ2, x13 ≤ x12, x13 ≤ x2. It follows that
x23 ≤ x12 and x23 ≤ x1. Since x23 ∈ Φ3, it means that there exists x23 ∈ Φ3 such that
x23 ≤ x12 and x23 ≤ x1 where x12, x1 ∈ Φ1. Hence, α w γ.
Case 2: There exist x23 ∈ Φ2 and x3 ∈ Φ3, for all x13, x1 ∈ Φ1, and x12, x2 ∈ Φ2:
x23 ≤ x13, x23 ≤ x1, x3 ≤ x12, x3 ≤ x2. In this case, there are in turn only the
following two possible sub-cases: either x23 ≤ x3 or x23 > x3. If x23 ≤ x3, since
x3 ≤ x12, it holds that x23 ≤ x12. Since x23 ≤ x1 and x23 ≤ x12, it holds that
α w γ. Second, if x23 > x3, since x23 ≤ x1, x3 ≤ x1. Since x3 ≤ x12 and x3 ≤ x1,
α w γ.
Case 3: There exists x2 ∈ Φ2, for all x13, x1 ∈ Φ1, x2 ≤ x13 and x2 ≤ x1; and
since x13 ∈ Φ3, assume that for all x12, x2 ∈ Φ2, x13 ≤ x12, x13 ≤ x2. In this case,
there are in turn only the following two possible sub-cases: x23 ≤ x13 or x3 ≤ x13,
or x23 > x13 and x3 > x13. If x23 ≤ x13 and x3 ≤ x13, it holds that α w γ. If
x23 > x13 and x3 > x13, it holds that x13 < x23 and x13 ≤ x2, and therefore β w α.
Contradiction.
Case 4: There exist x2 ∈ Φ2 and x3 ∈ Φ3, for all x13, x1 ∈ Φ1, and x12, x2 ∈ Φ2:
x2 ≤ x13, x2 ≤ x1, x3 ≤ x12, x3 ≤ x2. In this case, since x3 ≤ x12 and x3 ≤ x1, it
holds that α w γ.
For last link, if α l β and β l γ, then un ≥ vm and vm ≥ wk. It follows that
un ≥ wk, and therefore α l γ. So, it holds that l is transitive.
Given a way to lift the ordering on norms to an ordering on arguments, the notion
of defeat can be defined as follows.
Definition 9 (Defeat among arguments). Let H = 〈L,N , C, r〉 be a hierarchical
abstract normative system. For all α, β ∈ Arg(H),
α attacks β iff β has a sub-argument β′ such that
1. concl(α) = concl(β′)
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α defeats β iff β has a sub-argument β′ such that
1. concl(α) = concl(β′) and
2. α is a context argument; or α is an ordinary argument and α  β.
The set of defeats between the arguments in Arg(H) based on a preference ordering
 is denoted as Def(H,).
In what follows, an argument α = [u1, . . . , un] with ranking on norms is denoted
as u1 . . . un : r(α), where r(α) = (r(u1), . . . , r(un)).
The notions of arguments and defeat relations between arguments by the weakest
link and the last link principles respectively can be illustrated by the following example.
Example 6 (Order puzzle continued). Consider the hierarchical abstract normative sys-
tem in Example 1. We have the following arguments (visually presented in the top of
Figure 2):
A0 : w (context argument)
A1 : (w, h) : (1) (ordinary argument)
A2 : (w, h)(h, o) : (1, 3) (ordinary argument)
A3 : (w,¬o) : (2) (ordinary argument)
We have that A2 attacks A3 and vice versa, and there are no other attacks among the
arguments. Moreover, A2 defeats A3 by the last link principle (Figure 2, middle), and
A3 defeats A2 by the weakest link principle (Figure 2, bottom).
3.3 Argument extensions and conclusion extensions
Given a set of arguments A = Arg(H) and a set of defeats R = Def(H,), we get an
argumentation framework (AF) F = (A,R).
Following the notions of abstract argumentation by Dung [10], we say that a set
B ⊆ A is admissible, if and only if it is conflict-free and it can defend each argument
within the set. A set B ⊆ A is conflict-free if and only if there exist no arguments α
and β in B such that (α, β) ∈ R. Argument α ∈ A is defended by a set B ⊆ A (in
such a situation α can also be said to be acceptable with respect to B) if and only if for
all β ∈ A, if (β, α) ∈ R, then there exists γ ∈ B such that (γ, β) ∈ R. Based on the
notion of admissible sets, some other extensions can be defined. Formally, we have the
following.
Definition 10 (Conflict-freeness, defense and extensions). Let F = (A,R) be an
argumentation framework, and B ⊆ A a set of arguments.
– B is conflict-free if and only if @α, β ∈ B, such that (α, β) ∈ R.
– An argument α ∈ A is defended by B (equivalently α is acceptable with respect to
B), if and only if ∀(β, α) ∈ R, ∃γ ∈ B, such that (γ, β) ∈ R.
– B is admissible if and only ifB is conflict-free, and each argument inB is defended
by B.
– B is a complete extension if and only if B is admissible and each argument in A
that is defended by B is in B.
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– B is a preferred extension if and only if B is a maximal (with respect to set-
inclusion) complete extension.
– B is a grounded extension if and only if B is the minimal (with respect to set-
inclusion) complete extension.
– B is a stable extension if and only if B is conflict-free, and ∀α ∈ A \ B, ∃β ∈ B
such that (β, α) ∈ R.
A semantics describes the set of extensions one wishes to obtain. We use sem ∈
{cmp, prf, grd, stb} to denote the complete, preferred, grounded, and stable semantics,
respectively. A set of argument extensions of F = (A,R) is denoted as sem(F). We
write Outfamily for the set of conclusions from the extensions of the argumentation
theory [30].
Definition 11 (Conclusion extensions). Given a hierarchical abstract normative sys-
tem H = 〈L,N,C, r〉, let F = (Arg(H),Def(H,)) be the AF constructed from H.
The conclusion extensions, written as Outfamily(F , sem), are the conclusions of the
ordinary arguments within argument extensions.
Outfamily(F , sem) = {{concl(α) | α ∈ S, α is an ordinary argument} | S ∈ sem(F)}
The following example shows that for a hierarchical abstract normative system,
when adopting different principles for lifting the priorities over norms to those over ar-
guments, the resulting argumentation frameworks as well as their conclusion extensions
may be different.
Example 7 (Order puzzle in argumentation). According to Example 6, let A = {A0,
. . . , A3}. We haveF1 = (A, {(A2,A3)})whereA2 l A3, andF2 = (A, {(A3, A2)})
where A3 w A2. For all sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd, stb}, Outfamily(F1, sem) = {{h, o}},
and Outfamily(F2, sem) = {{h,¬o}}.
We now turn our attention to the properties of the argumentation theory for a hier-
archical abstract normative system.
First, according to Definition 9, we have the following proposition, capturing the
relation between the attack/defeat on an argument and on its super-arguments.
Proposition 2 (Super-argument attack and defeat). Let F = (A,R) be an AF con-
structed from a hierarchical abstract normative system. For all α, β ∈ A, if α attacks β,
then α attacks all super-arguments of β; if α defeats β, α defeats all super-arguments
of β.
Proof. When α attacks β, according to Definition 9, β has a sub-argument β′ such
that concl(α) = concl(β′). Let γ be an super-argument of β. It follows that β′ is a
sub-argument of γ. Hence, α attacks γ.
When α defeats β, according to Definition 9, β has a sub-argument β′ such that
concl(α) = concl(β′) and α is a context argument; or α is an ordinary argument and
α  β′, Since β′ is a sub-argument of γ, α defeats γ.
Second, corresponding to properties of sub-argument closure and direct consistency
in ASPIC+ [21], we have the following two properties.
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Proposition 3 (Closure under sub-arguments). Let F = (A,R) be an AF con-
structed from a hierarchical abstract normative system. For all sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd, stb},
∀E ∈ sem(F), if an argument α ∈ E, then sub(α) ⊆ E.
Proof. For every β ∈ sub(α), since α is acceptable with respect to E, it holds that β
is acceptable with respect to E. This is because for each γ ∈ R, if γ defeats β, then
according to Proposition 2, γ defeats α; since α ∈ E, there exists an η ∈ E such that η
defeats γ. Given that β is acceptable with respect to E and E is a complete extension,
it holds that β ∈ E.
Since all norms in a hierarchical abstract normative system are defeasible, we only
need to discuss direct consistency and contextual consistency.
Proposition 4 (Direct consistency). Let F = (A,R) be an AF constructed from
a hierarchical abstract normative system. For all sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd, stb}, ∀E ∈
sem(F), {concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an ordinary argument} is consistent.
Proof. Assume that there exist α, β ∈ E such that concl(α) = concl(β). Since both α
and β are ordinary arguments, α attacks β, and β attacks α. If α  β then α defeats β.
Otherwise, β defeats α. In both cases, E is not conflict-free, contradicting the fact that
E is a complete extension.
Proposition 5 (Contextual consistency). Let F = (A,R) be an AF constructed from
a hierarchical abstract normative systemH = 〈L,N,C, r〉. For all sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd,
stb}, ∀E ∈ sem(F), C ∪{concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an ordinary argument} is consistent.
Proof. Since C is consistent, we only need to verify that for all a ∈ C, for all α ∈ E,
{a, concl(α)} is consistent. We use proof by contradiction. Assume the contrary, i.e.,
concl(α) = a. It follows that a defeats α, and therefore α /∈ E. Contradiction. So
the assumption is false, i.e., C ∪ {concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an ordinary argument} is
consistent. This completes the proof.
In the next sections, we present representation results for the Greedy, Reduction
and Optimization approaches introduced in Section 2, identifying equivalences between
these approaches and the argument semantics based descriptions of a hierarchical ab-
stract normative system.
4 Representation results for Greedy
Based on the idea introduced in Section 1, for a totally ordered hierarchical abstract
normative system, we have the following lemma and proposition.
Lemma 1 (Unique extension of Greedy). Given a totally ordered hierarchical ab-
stract normative systemH = 〈L,N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumentation frame-
workF = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)), it holds thatF is acyclic, and therefore has a unique
extension under stable semantics.
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Proof. Since H is totally ordered, under w, the relation w among arguments is
acyclic. Assume the contrary. Then, there exist three distinct α, β, γ ∈ Arg(H) such that
α w β, β w γ and γ w α. According to Definition 8, when H is totally ordered,
it holds that α w β, β w γ and γ w α. According to Proposition 1, α w γ,
contradicting γ w α. Hence, F is acyclic, and therefore has a unique extension under
stable semantics.
Proposition 6 (Greedy is weakest link). Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract
normative system H = 〈L, N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumentation framework
F = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)), it holds that {Greedy(H)} = Outfamily(F , stb).
Proof. Our proof is constructive: given the Greedy extension, we show how to construct
a stable extension of the argumentation framework whose conclusions coincide with the
Greedy extension. Since the argumentation framework has only one extension (Lemma
4.2), this completes the proof.
By Definition 2.4., Greedy(H) is the set of elements x such that there is a path inH
from an element in C to x with respect to a set of norms R ⊆ N , inductively defined by
R = ∪∞i=0Ri, where R0 = ∅ and Ri+1 = Ri ∪max(N,C,Ri, r), max(N,C,Ri, r) =
{u ∈ Appl(N,C,Ri) | ∀v ∈ Appl(N,C,Ri) : r(u) ≥ r(v)} and Appl(N,C,R) :=
{(a, x) ∈ N \R | a ∈ C∪ cons(R), {x, x}6⊆ C ∪ cons(R)}.
Let E = {a ∈ Arg (H) | a ∈ C is a context argument}∪ {[u1, . . . , un] ∈ Arg(H) |
n ≥ 1, ant(u1) ∈ C, {ant(u2) . . . , ant(un), cons(un)} ⊆ Greedy(H)}. From the con-
sistency of the extensions (Proposition 3.11) and the construction of Greedy we know
that there is a consistent path to any element of Greedy(H), and thus for any argument
of Greedy(H) there is an ordinary argument with that element as its conclusion, and
thus Greedy(H) = {concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an ordinary argument}. Now we only need
to prove that E is a stable extension under weakest link.
We use proof by contradiction. Assume that E is not a stable extension. Given that
Greedy(H) is consistent, and thus the extensionE is conflict free, and given that context
arguments defeat all conflicting ordinary arguments and are thus included in E, there
must be α = [u1, . . . , un] ∈ Arg(H)\E, such that α is not defeated by any argument in
E. Since α /∈ E, there exist α′ = [u1, . . . , uj−1] ∈ E and α′′ = [u1, . . . , uj ] 6∈ E. Let
S ⊆ E be the set of arguments conflicting with α′′, thus each of them has a conclusion
cons(uj). So, α′′ defeats each argument β = [v1, . . . , vm] in S using weakest link, i.e.
α′′ w β. If Φ1 = {u1, . . . , un} and Φ2 = {v1, . . . , vm}, then according to Def 3.2,
∃v ∈ Φ2 \ Φ1 such that ∀u ∈ Φ1 \ Φ2, v ≤ u. Let M ⊆ N be the set of all these norms
v, i.e. all norms that occur in the arguments of S which are smaller than all the norms
in α′′, excluding norms that occur in α′′ itself.
We now consider the point in the construction of the greedy extension where an el-
ement of M was added to it, we consider Appl(N,C,R) and max(N,C,Ri, r), and
we derive the contradiction. Let i be the lowest index such that Ri does not con-
tain a norm of M . At this moment, Appl(N,C,Ri) also contains a norm in α′′, and
max(N,C,Ri, r) contains an element of M . However, by definition, all norms of M
are ranked lower than the norms in α′′. Contradiction. So the assumption is false, i.e.
E is a stable extension. This completes the proof.
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Note that Proposition 6 corresponds to Theorem 5.3 of Young et al.[32]. This corre-
spondence arises as follows. First, in the argumentation theory for a hierarchical abstract
normative system, we use disjoint elitist order to compare sets of norms, while in the
argumentation theory for prioritized default logic, Young et al. use a new order called a
structure-preference order, which takes into account the structure of how arguments are
constructed. Since in the setting of hierarchical abstract normative systems, arguments
are acyclic paths, it is not necessary to use the structure-preference order to compare ar-
guments. Second, due to the different ways of constructing argumentation frameworks,
the proof of Proposition 6 differs from that of Theorem 5.3 of Young et al. [32]. The
former considers the order of the applicability of norms in the proof, while the latter
uses the mechanism defined in the structure-preference order.
5 Representation result for Reduction
According to Brewka and Eiter [7], Reduction is based on the following two points.
1) The application of a rule with nonmonotonic assumptions means jumping to a con-
clusion. This conclusion is yet another assumption which has to be used globally in
the program for the issue of deciding whether a rule is applicable or not.
2) The rules must be applied in an order compatible with the priority information.
This global view of deciding whether a rule is applicable coincides with the last-
link principle of lifting a preference relation between rules to a priority relation between
resulting arguments. According to Definition 4 and the argumentation theory for a hier-
archical abstract normative system, we have the following representation result.
Proposition 7 (Reduction is last link). Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract
normative system H = 〈L,N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumentation framework
F = (Arg(H), Def(H,l)), it holds that Reduction(H) = Outfamily(F , stb).
Proof. We prove Reduction(H) = Outfamily(F , stb). by first proving that the left hand
side is a subset of the right hand side, and then by proving that the right hand side is a
subset of the left hand side.
We first prove Reduction(H) ⊆ Outfamily(F , stb).
Assume a set U ∈ Reduction(H). According to Definition 4 we have Greedy(HU )
where HX=〈L,N ′, C, r′〉, N ′ = {(>, x2) | (x1, x2) ∈ N, x1 ∈ C ∪X} is the set of
ordinary norms, and r′(>, x2) = max(r(x1, x2) | (x1, x2) ∈ N, x1 ∈ C ∪X) for all
(x1, x2) ∈ N are priorities over norms.
We now construct a stable extension of F such that its conclusions are exactly U .
Let E be the set of arguments that can be constructed from elements of U , just like
in the proof of Greedy. So E = {a ∈ Arg (H) | a ∈ C is a context argument} ∪
{[u1, . . . , un] ∈ Arg(H) | n ≥ 1, ant(u1) ∈ C, {ant(u2) . . . , ant(un), cons(un)} ⊆
U}. From the consistency of the extensions (Proposition 3.11) and the construction of
Reduction we know that there is a consistent path to any element of U , and thus for any
argument of U there is an ordinary argument with that element as its conclusion, and
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thus U = {concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an ordinary argument}. Now we only need to prove
that E is a stable extension.
We use proof by contradiction, just like in the proof of Greedy. Assume that E is not
stable. Given that context arguments defeat all conflicting ordinary arguments, there
must be a β = [v1, . . . , vn] ∈ Arg(H) \E, such that β is not defeated by any argument
in E. Since β /∈ E, there exists β′ = [v1, . . . , vj ] in E and β′′ = [v1, . . . , vj+1]
not in E. Let S ⊆ E be the set of arguments attacking β′′, thus each of them has a
conclusion cons(vj+1). Since β′′ is not defeated by any argument inE, β′′ defeats each
argument in S. Then, the last link of β′′ is higher than the last links of all arguments of
S. Consequently, the rank of vj+1 is higher than the rank of all norms with consequent
cons(vj+1). But this means that in N ′, the rank of (>, cons(vj+1)) is higher than the
rank of (>, cons(vj+1)). Then by the construction of Reduction, i.e., Greedy(HU ), we
have that cons(vj+1) must be in U , a contradiction. Thus the assumption is false, i.e.,
E is stable, and this completes the proof that Reduction(H) ⊆ Outfamily(F , stb).
To complete our proof, we now show that Reduction(H) ⊇ Outfamily(F , stb). Let
E be a stable extension of F = (Arg(H), Def(H,l)). Thus E is conflict free, closed
under sub-arguments, and for all arguments not in E, there is an argument in E defeat-
ing it. In particular, for any β′ = [v1, . . . , vj ] in E and β′′ = [v1, . . . , vj+1] not in E,
there is an argument in E defeating β′′.
Moreover, let U = {concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an ordinary argument}. From the
contextual consistency of stable extensions (Proposition 3.12), we know that U ∪ C is
consistent. Since defeat is based on last link, it means that for every norm applicable in
U whose conclusion c is not in U , there is a higher ranked norm applicable in U whose
conclusion is c. Consider HU=〈L,N ′, C, r′〉, N ′ = {(>, x2) | (x1, x2) ∈ N, x1 ∈
C ∪ U} is the set of ordinary norms, and r′(>, x2) = max(r(x1, x2) | (x1, x2) ∈
N, x1 ∈ C ∪ U) for all (x1, x2) ∈ N are priorities over norms. Assume there is an
x ∈ U with (>, x), (>, x) ∈ N ′. Due to the above the rank of (>, x) is higher than the
rank of (>, x), and thus x ∈ Greedy(HU ).
Thus U = Greedy(HU ), i.e. U ∈ Reduction(H), and that completes our proof.
Now, let us consider the following three examples, which show that by Reduction, a
hierarchical abstract normative system and the corresponding argumentation framework
may have a unique extension, multiple extensions, or an empty extension.
Example 8 (Order puzzle, Reduction). Consider Example 7 when the last link principle
is applied, A2 defeats A3. Then, we have Outfamily(F1, stb) = {{h, o}}, which is
equal to Reduction(H).
Example 9 (Reduction, Multiple extensions). Consider the hierarchical abstract norma-
tive system of Figure 3 when the last link principle is applied. We obtain the argu-
mentation framework shown in Figure 4, written as F3, yielding Outfamily(F3, stb) =
{{b, c}, {¬b}}. Note that here, we have two distinct stable extensions.
Since stable extensions do not necessarily exist for all argumentation frameworks,
the Reduction of a hierarchical abstract normative system might not exist.
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A4
[(a, b), (b, c), (c, b)]
A1
[(a, b)]
A2
[(a,¬b)]
A3
[(a, b), (b, c)]
A0
[a]
Fig. 4. The argumentation framework obtained for the hierarchical abstract normative system of
Figure 3.
A4
[(r, z)]
A1
[r]
A2
[p]
A3
[(b, c)]
A0
[b]
A8A7
A6 A5
[(p,¬d)][(b, c), (c, d)]
[(r, z), (z,¬c)] [(p,¬d), [(¬d,¬z)]]
Fig. 5. An argumentation framework with no stable extension.
Example 10 (Reduction, Empty extension). Consider the hierarchical abstract norma-
tive systemH = 〈L,N,C, r〉whereN = {(c, d), (p,¬d), (z,¬c), (¬d,¬z), (r, z), (b, c)},
C = {b, r, p} and r(c, d) = 5, r(p,¬d) = 4, r(z,¬c) = 6, r(¬d,¬z) = 2, r(r, z) = 1
and r(b, c) = 0. When the last link principle is applied, this hierarchical abstract nor-
mative system yields the argumentation framework shown in Figure 5, which has no
stable extension.
6 Representation result for Optimization
In principle, Optimization is realized by adding norms in order of priority which are
consistent with the context, until no more norms can be added, obtaining a maximal set
of obeyable norms, following which conclusions can be computed. For each norm that
does not belong to the maximal set of obeyable norms, if it is in a consistent path of a
hierarchical abstract normative system H, it is the weakest norm of this path. In terms
of the terminology of argumentation, a consistent path of H is an argument of the cor-
responding argumentation framework. Hence, for an ordinary argument, if its top norm
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is the weakest norm that does not belong to the maximal obeyable set, then this argu-
ment should not be accepted. In other words, this argument should be defeated by some
accepted argument. Furthermore, when an argument is rejected, all its super-arguments
should be rejected. For instance, as illustrated in Figure 1, the maximal obeyable set of
norms is {(h, o), (w,¬o)}. The norm (w, h) does no belong to this set. So, the argu-
ments containing (w, h), i.e., [(w, h)] and [(w, h), (h, o)], should be rejected.
In this paper, given an argument α, a sub-argument of α is called the weakest sub-
argument of α, if it is an ordinary argument and its top norm is the weakest norm of
α.
Definition 12 (Weakest sub-argument). Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract
normative system H = 〈L, N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumentation framework
F = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)), for all α = [u1, . . . , un] ∈ Arg(H), if ui is the weakest
norm of α, then the ordinary sub-argument of α whose top norm is ui is called the
weakest sub-argument of α.
Then, the set of super-arguments of α′ —the weakest sub-argument of α— is called
the weakest arguments with respect to α, formally defined as follows.
Definition 13 (Weakest argument). Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract nor-
mative system H = 〈L, N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumentation framework
F = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)), for all α = [u1, . . . , un] ∈ Arg(H), let α′ be the weakest
sub-argument of α. Then, the set of weakest arguments with respect to α is defined as
warg(α) = sup(α′).
The notion of weakest arguments can be illustrated by the following example.
Example 11 (Order puzzle, weakest arguments). Consider the argumentation frame-
work in Figure 2. When applying the weakest link principle, A3 defeats A2. According
to Definition 13, warg(A1) = {A1}, warg(A2) = {A1, A2}, and warg(A3) = {A3}.
Based on the concept of weakest arguments, when an argument α defeats another ar-
gument β according to the weakest link principle, there are two different cases, namely
that α is in the set of weakest arguments with respect to β, or that it is not.
First, consider the case where α is in warg(β). In this case, it means that the weakest
norm of β is also the weakest norm of α.
Proposition 8 (Shared weakest norm). Given F = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)), for all
(α, β) ∈ Def(H,w), if u is the weakest norm of β and α ∈ warg(β), then u is the
weakest norm of α.
Proof. We use proof by contradiction. Assume that u is not the weakest norm of α.
Then, there exists u′ such that u > u′. Since u′ does not belong to β, it holds that
β w α. This contradicts (α, β) ∈ Def(H,w). Thus the assumption is false, i.e., u is
the weakest norm of α.
Given that α and β share a weakest norm, according to the definition of Optimiza-
tion, this weakest norm does not belong to the maximal obeyable set. Hence, both α
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and β cannot be accepted. In this paper, we use an auxiliary argument aux to defeat all
arguments in warg(β) that should not be accepted.
The second case occurs when α is not in warg(β). Here, the weakest norm of α is
superior to the weakest norm of β. So, if α is accepted, then all arguments in warg(β)
should be rejected. For this purpose, we may use α to defeat each argument in warg(β).
In addition, since the defeat from α to each super-argument of β is already in Arg(H),
only the arguments in warg(β) ∩ psub(β) should be added to Arg(H).
According to the above observations, an expanded argumentation framework of F
with auxiliary defeats on weakest arguments is defined as follows.
Definition 14 (Expanded argumentation framework with additional defeats on weak-
est arguments). Let F = (Arg(H),Def(H,w)) be an argumentation framework that
is constructed from a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system H = 〈L,
N,C, r〉, and aux be an auxiliary argument such that aux /∈ Arg(H). The expanded
argumentation framework of F with auxiliary defeats on weakest arguments is F ′ =
(Arg(H)∪{aux}, Def(H,w)∪Φ1∪Φ2)whereΦ1 = ∪(α,β)∈Def(H,w)∧α/∈warg(β){(α, γ) |
γ ∈ warg(β) ∩ psub(β)}, and Φ2 = ∪(α,β)∈Def(H,w)∧α∈warg(β){(aux, γ) | γ ∈
warg(β)}.
In Definition 14, Φ1 is the set of defeats from α that is not a weakest argument with
respect to β, and Φ2 is the set of defeats from the auxiliary argument aux when α is a
weakest argument with respect to β.
The following lemma and proposition show that Optimization can be represented in
formal argumentation by using weakest link together with auxiliary defeats.
Lemma 2 (Unique extension of Optimization). LetH = 〈L, N,C, r〉 be a totally or-
dered hierarchical abstract normative system, and F ′ be an argumentation framework
of H with additional defeats on weakest arguments presented in Definition 13. It holds
that F ′ is acyclic, and therefore has a unique extension under stable semantics.
Proof. According to Lemma 1,F is acyclic. The addition of Φ2 does not produce cycles.
Meanwhile, for all (α, γ) ∈ Φ1, since α defeats β and γ is a weakest argument with
respect to β, α w γ. So, the addition of Φ2 does not produce cycles either. As a result,
F ′ is acyclic, and therefore has a unique extension under stable semantics.
Proposition 9 (Optimization is weakest link plus auxiliary defeats). Let H = 〈L,
N,C, r〉 be a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system, and F ′ be an
argumentation framework of H with additional defeats on weakest arguments pre-
sented in Definition 13. It holds that Optimization(H) = {concl(α) | α ∈ E \
{aux}, α is an ordinary argument} where E is the unique stable extension of F ′.
Proof. This proof is similar to that of Greedy: given the Optimization extension, we
show how to construct a stable extension of the expanded argumentation framework
whose conclusions coincide with the Optimization extension. Since the argumentation
framework has only one extension (Lemma 2), this completes the proof.
By Definition 5, Optimization(H) is the set of elements x such that there is a path
in H from an element in C to x with respect to a set of norms R ⊆ N . Given T =
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(u1, u2, . . . , un) the linear order on N such that u1 > u2 > · · · > un, R is inductively
defined by R = Rn, where R0 = ∅; Ri+1 = Ri∪{ui} if C ∪R(C) is consistent where
R = Ri ∪ {ui}, and Ri+1 = Ri otherwise.
Let E = {aux} ∪ {α ∈ Arg (H) | α ∈ C is a context argument} ∪ {[u1, . . . , un] ∈
Arg(H) | n ≥ 1, ant(u1) ∈ C, {ant(u2) . . . , ant(un), cons(un)} ⊆ Optimization(H)}.
From the consistency of the extensions (Proposition 3.11) and the construction of Opti-
mization we know that there is a consistent path to any element of Optimization(H),
and thus for any argument of Optimization(H) there is an ordinary argument with
that element as its conclusion, and thus Optimization(H) = {concl(α) | α ∈ E \
{aux}, α is an ordinary argument}.
Now we only need to prove that E is a stable extension of F ′.
We use proof by contradiction. So assume that E is not a stable extension. On the
one hand, given that Optimization(H) is consistent, and thus the extension E is conflict
free, and given that context arguments defeat all conflicting ordinary arguments and are
thus included in E, there must be α = [u1, . . . , un] ∈ Arg(H) \ E, such that α is not
defeated by any argument in E. On the other hand, since α /∈ E, there exists a weakest
norm uj of α such that uj /∈ R. Let i be the index where uj can not be added to Ri
since C ∪ R(C) is consistent where R = Rj+1 = Ri ∪ {uj}. Let α′ = [u1, . . . , uk]
where k ≥ j, and β = [v1, . . . , vm] such that {v1, . . . , vm} ⊆ Ri+1 and vm = uk.
Since uj < v for all v ∈ Ri, it holds that β defeats α′. Then, we have the following two
possible cases. If uj ∈ {v1, . . . , vm}, then α is defeated by aux ∈ E. Contradiction.
Otherwise, uj /∈ {v1, . . . , vm}. In this case, {v1, . . . , vm} ⊆ Ri and C ∪ R(C) is
consistent where R = Ri. So, β is in E. Contradiction. So the assumption is false, i.e.,
E is a stable extension. This completes the proof.
Now, let us consider a revised version of the Order puzzle as follows.
Example 12 (Order puzzle, Optimization). Let H′ = 〈L,N,C, r〉 be a hierarchical ab-
stract normative system, where L = {w, h, o,¬w,¬h,¬o,>}, N = {(w, h), (w,¬h),
(h, o), (¬h, o), (w,¬o)}, C = {w,>}, r(w, h) = 1, r(w,¬h) = 0, r(h, o) = 3,
r(¬h, o) = 4, r(w,¬o) = 2. The maximal set of obeyable norms isR = {(¬h, o), (h, o),
(w,¬o)} and so Optimization(H′) = {¬o}. Figure 6 illustrates the argumentation
framework obtained from this hierarchical abstract normative system, by adding an
auxiliary argument and two auxiliary defeats. In this example, since A5 is neither in
warg(A3) = {A1, A3} nor in warg(A4) = {A2, A4}, the two auxiliary defeats are
from A5 to A1 and A2 respectively. Then, under stable semantics, the expanded argu-
mentation framework has a unique extensionE = {aux, A0, A5}. As a result, the set of
conclusions {concl(α) | α ∈ E\{aux}, α is an ordinary argument} = {concl(A5)} =
{¬o}.
Finally, let us consider an expanded argumentation framework where auxiliary de-
feats are from the auxiliary argument aux.
Example 13 (Empty Optimization). Let H = 〈L,N , C, r〉 be a hierarchical abstract
normative system, where L = {a, b, c,¬a,¬b,¬c,>}, N = {(a, b), (b, c), (b,¬c)},
C = {a,>}, r(a, b) = 1, r(b, c) = 2, r(b,¬c) = 3. The maximal set of obeyable
norms is R = {(b, c), (b,¬c)} and so Optimization(H) = ∅. Figure 7 illustrates
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A0
A3
A1
A4
A2
A5
aux
[(w, h)] [(w,¬h)] [w]
[(w, h), (h, o)]
[(w,¬o)][(w,¬h), (¬h, o)]
Fig. 6. Argumentation framework expanded by an auxiliary argument and two auxiliary defeats
(denoted using dashed lines).
the argumentation framework obtained from this hierarchical abstract normative sys-
tem, by adding an auxiliary argument and three auxiliary defeats. In this example,
since A3 is in warg(A2) = {A1, A2, A3}, the three auxiliary defeats are from aux.
Then, under stable semantics, the expanded argumentation framework has a unique ex-
tension E = {aux, A0}. As a result, the set of conclusions {concl(α) | α ∈ E \
{aux}, α is an ordinary argument} = ∅.
A0
[a]
A1 A2
A3
[(a, b)] [(a, b), (b, c)]
[(a, b), (b,¬c)]
aux
Fig. 7. Argumentation framework expanded by an auxiliary argument and three auxiliary defeats
(denoted using dashed lines).
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7 Discussions and related work
In the previous sections, after defining three detachment procedures for totally ordered
hierarchical abstract normative systems motivated by the Order puzzle example, we
formulated an argumentation theory to represent them. The role of examples in the study
of logic has a long and rich history. Traditionally, a logic was proposed to model some
example problem, following which examples were introduced to highlight paradoxes
or inconsistencies in the logic, whereupon a new logic was proposed to address these
problems, and the cycle repeated. While this approach has significantly enriched the
field, it is not without problems. For example, there is still a debate regarding deontic
detachment within the community, as in some cases, deontic detachment intuitively
holds, and in other cases it does not [25]. Given this, we do not seek to claim that
the detachment procedures we present in this paper are in any sense the ‘right’ logics.
Instead, our goal is to answer the following questions.
1. What are the general properties of systems considered relevant to some problem?
2. Given an application, what choices should be made in order to obtain a solution?
In this paper, the systems we considered are the three different detachment proce-
dures, encoded in the general framework of hierarchical abstract normative systems.
The property we considered is then the conclusions that one can draw from each of the
detachment procedures in the context of prioritized norms, which we describe in the
context of an argumentation system.
Our results then characterize the outputs of Greedy, Reduction and Optimization
in terms of argumentation for a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system,
allowing one to decide which approach is relevant to their needs by understanding the
effects of each approach through the argumentation literature. The semantics associated
with each approach also sheds light on the complexity of computing conclusions in the
normative context.
Furthermore, it is important to note that our representation results only hold when
the hierarchical abstract normative system is totally ordered. This is illustrated by the
following example, which shows that Greedy does not match the results of weakest link
when one does not have a total order over preferences.
Let H = 〈L,N,C, r〉 be a hierarchical abstract normative system, where N =
{(a, b), (a, c), (b,¬c), (c,¬b)} C = {a} and r(a, b) = 1, r(a, c) = 1, r(b,¬c) = 2
and r(c,¬b) = 2}. On the one hand, by Greedy, there are two extensions {b,¬c} and
{c,¬b}. On the other hand, by the weakest link principle, the argumentation framework
constructed from H is illustrated in Figure 8. Under stable semantics, there are three
extensions {A0, A1, A2}, {A0, A1, A3}, and {A0, A3, A4}. So, there are three conclu-
sion extensions {b,¬c}, {b, c}, {c,¬b}. As a result, the set of conclusions obtained by
Greedy is not equal to the one obtained by argumentation using the weakest link princi-
ple. We leave identifying valid representation results for hierarchical abstract normative
systems containing preference preorders as an avenue for future research.
Regarding related work, Young et al. [32] endowed Brewka’s prioritized default
logic (PDL) with argumentation semantics using the ASPIC+ framework for structured
argumentation [22]. More precisely, their goal is to define a preference ordering over
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A0
A2
A1 A4
A3
[a]
[(a, b), (b,¬c)] [(a, c)]
[(a, b)] [(a, c), (c,¬b)]
Fig. 8. Argumentation framework constructed from a preordered hierarchical abstract normative
system.
arguments %, based on the strict total order over defeasible rules defined to instantiate
ASPIC+ to PDL, so as to ensure that an extension within PDL corresponds to the jus-
tified conclusions of its ASPIC+ instantiation. Several options are investigated, and
they demonstrate that the standard ASPIC+ elitist ordering cannot be used to calcu-
late % as there is no correspondence between the argumentation-defined inferences and
PDL, and the same holds for a disjoint elitist preference ordering. The authors come
up with a new argument preference ordering definition which captures both preferences
over arguments and also when defeasible rules become applicable in the arguments’
construction, leading to the definition of a strict total order on defeasible rules and
corresponding non-strict arguments. Their representation theorem shows that a corre-
spondence always exists between the inferences made in PDL and the conclusions of
justified arguments in the ASPIC+ instantiation under stable semantics.
Brewka and Eiter [7] consider programs supplied with priority information, which
is given by a supplementary strict partial ordering of the rules. This additional informa-
tion is used to solve potential conflicts. Moreover, their idea is that conclusions should
be only those literals that are contained in at least one answer set. They propose to
use preferences on rules for selecting a subset of the answer sets, called the preferred
answer sets. In their approach, a rule is applied unless it is defeated via its assump-
tions by rules of higher priorities. Our definition (Def. 4) and the original formalism of
Brewka and Eiter [7] are different, in the sense that in our definition we do not make
use of default negation to represent the exceptions, i.e., the defeasibility, of a (strict)
rule. Rather, we use defeasible rules and the notion of the applicability of such rules.
This means that the correct translation of the Order Puzzle of Example 1 ends up with
the following logic program5:
5 Note that in Nrewka and Eiter’s original formulation [7] r0 < r3 means that r0 has higher
priority than r3.
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r0 : w.
r1 : h : - not ¬h, w.
r2 : ¬o : - not o, w.
r3 : o : - not ¬o, h.
r0 < r3 < r2 < r1
If preferences are disregarded, then this logic program has two answer sets: {w, h,¬o}
and {w, h, o}. Thus, considering preferences, the latter is the unique preferred answer
set. After dropping the contextw from the answer set, we get an extension {h, o}, which
is identical to the result obtained in Example 3.
Dung [11] presents an approach to deal with contradictory conclusions in defeasible
reasoning with priorities. More precisely, he starts from the observation that often, the
proposed approaches to defeasible reasoning with priorities (e.g., [5,27,21]) sanction
contradictory conclusions, as exemplified byASPIC+ using the weakest link principle
together with the elitist ordering which returns contradictory conclusions with respect
to its other three attack relations, and the conclusions reached with the well known
approach of Brewka and Eiter [7]. Dung shows then that the semantics for any complex
interpretation of default preferences can be characterized by a subset of the set of stable
extensions with respect to the normal attack relation assignments, i.e., a normal form for
ordinary attack relation assignments. In the setting of this paper, the notion of ‘normal
attack relation’ could be defined as follows. Let α = (a1, . . . , an) and β = (b1, . . . , bm)
be arguments constructed from a hierarchical abstract normative system. Since we have
no Pollock style undercutting argument (as in ASPIC+) and each norm is assumed to be
defeasible, α is said to normally attack argument β if and only if β has a sub-argument
β′ such that concl(α) = concl(β′), and r((an−1, an)) ≥ r((bm−1, bm)). According to
Definitions 8 and 9, the normal defeat relation is equivalent to the defeat relation using
the last link principle in this paper.
Kakas et al. [18] present a logic of arguments called argumentation logic, where
the foundations of classical logical reasoning are represented from an argumentation
perspective. More precisely, their goal is to integrate into the single argumentative rep-
resentation framework both classical reasoning, as in propositional logic, and defeasible
reasoning.
You et al. [31] define a prioritized argumentative characterization of non-monotonic
reasoning, by casting default reasoning as a form of prioritized argumentation. They
illustrate how the parameterized formulation of priority may be used to allow various
extensions and modifications to default reasoning.
We, and all these approaches, share the idea that an argumentative characterization
of NMR formalisms, like prioritized default logic in Young’s case and hierarchical ab-
stract normative systems in our approach, contributes to make the inference process
more transparent to humans. However, the targeted NMR formalism is different, lead-
ing to different challenges in the representation results. To the best of our knowledge,
no other approach addressed the challenge of an argumentative characterization of pri-
oritized normative reasoning.
The reason we study prioritized normative reasoning in the setting of formal ar-
gumentation is twofold. First, formal argumentation has been recognized as a popular
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research area in AI, thanks to its ability to make the inference process more intuitive
and provide natural explanations for the reasoning process [8]; its flexibility in dealing
with the dynamics of the system; and its appeal in sometimes being more computation-
ally efficient than competing approaches. Second, while some progress has been made
on the use of priorities within argumentation (e.g., [2,21]), how to represent different
approaches for prioritized normative reasoning in argumentation is still a challenging
issue.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we embedded three approaches to prioritized normative reasoning—namely
the Greedy [32], Reduction [5] and Optimization [13] approaches—within the frame-
work of a hierarchical abstract normative system. Within such a system, conditional
norms are represented by a binary relation over literals, and priorities are represented
by natural numbers. Hierarchical abstract normative systems provide an elegant visual-
isation of a normative system, with conflicts shown as two paths to a proposition and its
negation. Since both conflicts and exceptions can be encoded, such systems are inher-
ently non-monotonic. In Dung [10], the author pointed out that “many of the major ap-
proaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in AI and logic programming are different forms
of argumentation”, and inspired by this, we described how arguments can be instanti-
ated as paths through a hierarchical abstract normative system; demonstrated that this
instantiation satisfies certain desirable properties; and described how attacks and de-
feats between these arguments can be identified. Defeats in particular are dependent on
the priorities associated with the arguments, and several different techniques have been
proposed to lift priorities from argument components — made up of norms in the con-
text of our work — to the arguments themselves [21]. We demonstrated that for a total
ordering of priorities, lifting priorities to arguments based on the weakest link principle,
evaluated using the stable semantics, is equivalent to Greedy; that lifting priorities to
arguments based on last link and using the stable semantics is equivalent to Reduction;
and that the Optimization approach can be encoded by an argumentation system which
uses weakest link together with the stable semantics, and which introduces additional
defeats capturing implicit conflicts between arguments.
This last result—which requires a relatively complex argumentative representation—
opens up an interesting avenue for future work, namely in determining which non-
monotonic logics can be easily captured through standard formal argumentation tech-
niques, and which require additional rules or axioms in order to be represented. We note
that on the argumentation side, work on bipolar argumentation (e.g., [9]) has considered
introducing additional defeats between arguments based on some notion of support, and
we intend to investigate how the additional defeats we introduced can be categorized in
such frameworks.
Apart from our representation results, the use of argumentation allows us to make
some useful observations, such as that Reduction will sometimes not reach any conclu-
sions. Furthermore, argumentation can be used to provide explanation [8]. When imple-
mented, a system building on our approach can help users understand what norms they
should comply with, and why. For large normative systems, the use of stable semantics
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to compute Reduction and Optimization results in a high computational overhead, while
Greedy is computationally efficient. Ultimately, selecting the correct reasoning proce-
dure thus requires giving consideration to both reasoning complexity, and the domain
in which the system will be used.
In closing, our main observations can be summarized as follows. First, from a
normative systems perspective, we know there are many many logics of prioritized
rules/norms, and we consider only three here. The choice we make (Greedy, Reduction
and Optimization) may seem arbitrary. However, many other examples, in particular
detachment procedures not satisfying defeasible deontic detachment, are much easer
to characterize, while the three throughput variants of Greedy, Reduction and Opti-
mization can be derived from the existing results. Furthermore, these three alternatives
display quite diverse behavior, and are illustrative of the various kind of approaches
around.
Second, the results we present are interesting and promising, but the work on repre-
senting prioritized rules/norms using argumentation has only begun, and there are many
open issues. In particular, the restriction to totally ordered systems must be relaxed in
future work.
Third, given the large number of possibilities and the vast existing literature on
normative rules/norms, a different methodology is needed for dealing with prioritized
rules/norms in formal argumentation.
Finally, one may wonder why our results have not been shown before, given the
long standing discussion on weakest vs last link at least since the work of Pollock [24],
and the central role of prioritized rules in many structured argumentation theories like
ASPIC+. The reason, we believe, is that it is easier to study these issues on a small
fragment, like hierarchical abstract normative systems, than on a very general theory
like ASPIC+.
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